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INTRODUCTION 
As developed in the Introduction to this symposium, the Warren Court 
criminal procedure revolution came with a cost.1 Journalist Fred Graham wrote 
that some of the Court’s decisions produced a “self-inflicted wound.”2 
Commentators believe that the Court’s criminal procedural revolution tipped the 
1968 Presidential election to Richard Nixon, who then rapidly altered the 
composition of the Supreme Court with four appointments in his first two years of 
office.3 
 
* Michael Vitiello, Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of 
Law; University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend special thanks to 
Joanne Gothard and Cameron Graber for their capable research assistance with this article. 
1.  Many Americans were troubled by Supreme Court decisions, believing the Court to be too lenient on 
defendants and blaming the Court for rapidly rising crime rates. See Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Causes of Crime, 
38 PUB. OP. QUARTERLY 288, 292 (1974) (listing 1969 Louis Harris & Assoc. poll showing 51% and 23% of 
Americans believed “Supreme Court decisions protecting rights of accused” were a “Major Cause” and “Minor 
Cause” of “an increase in crime,” respectively); see also id. at 294 (detailing a Gallup poll showing 63% of 
Americans in 1968, and 75% of Americans in 1969, believed “the courts” were “not harsh enough” when “dealing 
with criminals.”); see also James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
May 1972, https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politics/crime/crimewar.htm (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
2.  FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 153–93 (1970). 
3.  LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 243–49 (1983); see also EARL M. MALTZ, THE 
COMING OF THE NIXON COURT: THE 1972 TERM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2016); 
KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL 
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The Warren Court had many critics. Commentators continue to question the 
legitimacy of the Warren Court’s Criminal Procedure revolution.4 Others doubt its 
wisdom.5 Some critics have argued that the Warren Court’s attention to procedural 
protections came with a cost to racial justice.6 For example, in his widely 
acclaimed book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, the late William 
Stuntz argued that the Warren Court deserves much of the blame for the collapse 
of the American criminal justice system.7 Specifically, he claimed that the Warren 
Court’s reliance on due process, rather than on equal protection, led to the 
appearance that the Court was coddling violent offenders at the expense of 
innocent victims in their protection of African-Americans.8 The backlash against 
the Court led to increased punishment, and to the War on Drugs.9 
Those of us who support the Warren Court’s criminal revolution might address 
any number of criticisms leveled against the Court.10 Instead, this paper focuses on 
one specific criticism. Professor George Thomas, a participant in this symposium, 
has argued that the Warren Court was overly concerned with procedural 
protections,11 and that those protections often advanced values unrelated to the 
 
CONSEQUENCES 37–62 (2011); William G. Ross, The Supreme Court as an Issue in Presidential Campaigns, 37 
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 322, 331 (2012). 
4.  See, e.g., RICHARD Y. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION? THE WARREN COURT AND 
THE BURGER COURT: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN MODERN AMERICA 297–325 (1977) (arguing the 
“nationalizing” aspect of the Warren Court’s decision-making “was not unique to the Warren Court”); see also 
Robert Weisberg, Criminal Procedure Doctrine: Some Versions of the Skeptical, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
832 (1985); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really 
So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices in THE BURGER COURT 62, 63 (Vincent Blasi ed. 
1983) (arguing that, “more often than not, [the Warren Court’s] criminal procedure decisions reflected a pattern 
of moderation and compromise,” despite its “public reputation as a bold, crusading court.”). 
5.  See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1441 (1985) (attacking the 
underlying premise of Miranda as, inter alia, an unethical attempt to give suspects a “sporting chance”); see also 
Louis Michel Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 744 (1992) (arguing that Warren’s most 
controversial cases are “best characterized as a retreat from the promise of liberal individualism brilliantly 
camouflaged under the cover of bold advance.”); RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, eds., THE MIRANDA 
DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING (1998). 
6.  E.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411 (2002); see also Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? 
A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 685, 827 (2017) (reaching the conclusion that Miranda has “made it noticeably more difficult for police 
officers to obtain confessions.”); WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (2011); 
but see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social 
Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 501 (1996). 
7.  See STUNTZ, supra note 6, at 9 (arguing “the ways the [Warren] Court exacerbated the inequality and 
instability that plagued late twentieth-century criminal justice.”). 
8.  Id. at 225–36. 
9.  See id. at 244–81 (“By providing focal points for public anger, the coincidence of urban race riots and 
pro-defendant Warren Court decisions like Mapp and Miranda helped to nationalize the backlash and made it 
more extreme when it came.”). 
10.  Along the way we might agree with some of the criticisms without losing faith in the larger body of 
work. 
11.  E.g., GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 
SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS (2008); see also George C. Thomas III, Through a Glass Darkly: Seeing the 
Real Warren Court Criminal Justice Legacy, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2005) (proposing that “once Nixon 
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protection of the innocent.12 Thomas has also argued that the primary goal of our 
criminal justice system should be the protection of innocent defendants, and that 
the Warren Court justices were indifferent to offenders’ guilt or innocence, 
offering only procedural remedies.13 
This paper disputes Thomas’s view of the Warren Court in one particular area, 
wherein I argue that the Warren Court was on a path that would have provided 
meaningful protection for innocent defendants: The Warren Court’s efforts to 
protect against unreliable eyewitness identification. In United States v. Wade14 and 
Gilbert v. California,15 the Court held that post-indictment eyewitness 
identification was a critical stage of criminal proceedings, requiring the presence 
of counsel. Gilbert also held that even if a witness made an identification at a lineup 
without counsel present, the witness might make an in-court identification as long 
as the prosecution could establish an independent basis for such evidence.16 
Finally, in Stovall v. Denno,17 the Court held that the Wade-Gilbert holding did not 
apply retroactively. Nonetheless, the Court in Stovall found that if an identification 
procedure was so “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification,” the court must suppress the evidence because its use at trial would 
otherwise violate due process.18 
Within just a few years after the Burger Court’s inception, the Court eroded 
many of the Warren Court decisions past recognition.19 The Burger Court held that 
Wade-Gilbert protection applied only after commencement of formal 
proceedings20 and had no application to a photo array or “show-up.”21 Thus, the 
appearance of counsel at a lineup, as a matter of constitutional protection, 
continues to be exceedingly rare.22 
This paper argues that Justice Brennan’s majority opinions in Wade-Gilbert 
 
appointed four new justices, the [Warren Court] liberal belief in procedure rather than substance began to appear 
naïve.”); George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process and the Protection of 
Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 (2005). 
12.  See Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 170 (“[T]he road taken by the Warren Court . . . did 
not produce a fair and just process . . . it harmed innocent defendants.”). One might debate, for example, whether 
the Warren Court’s extension of the exclusionary rule, thereby limiting arbitrary police searches, was legitimate, 
even though enforcement of the Fourth Amendment most immediately protects guilty offenders. Protection for 
the innocent is less direct and defies calculation: only if police fail to stop, detain and search innocent individuals 
because they have been deterred by the Fourth Amendment do innocent individuals benefit from the Fourth 
Amendment.  
13.  See Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 7–8 (“Anyone who was designing a criminal justice 
process from scratch would, I think, worry less about the privacy rights of guilty suspects and more about 
protecting the innocent from being convicted.”). 
14.  388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967). 
15.  388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). 
16.  Id.  
17.  388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
18.  Id. at 302. 
19.  Infra Part II & Part III. 
20.  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
21.  United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). 
22.  THOMAS, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 164–65. 
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were ambiguous: Were they really Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases, as 
most commentators see them?23 Alternatively, were they Confrontation Clause 
cases?24 If they were Confrontation Clause cases, they were about protecting 
innocent defendants from unjust convictions.25 In addition, the Warren Court’s 
ruling in Stovall, upholding the admissibility of identifications made under 
obviously suggestive circumstances, is certainly open to criticism. Despite that, 
shortly before the end of the Warren Court, the Court demonstrated a commitment 
to protecting potentially innocent defendants from unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures in Foster v. California. Foster demonstrates that the Court’s due 
process test could have teeth. This paper explores the implications of my argument 
that the Wade trilogy was grounded in the Confrontation Clause, rather than the 
traditional, narrow interpretation as right to counsel cases. Notably, a suspect 
might have been entitled to protection under the Confrontation Clause in settings 
where she would have no protection under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.26 
As such, the Warren Court could have provided protection against one of the most 
common causes resulting in the conviction of innocent defendants: eyewitness 
misidentification.27 
Part I of this article reviews the Court’s eyewitness identification case law, and 
makes two points: After reviewing the Wade-Gilbert cases, the article evaluates 
the Burger Court’s rapid erosion of the Wade-Gilbert protections.28 Second, while 
those cases were largely rendered irrelevant by the Burger Court, Wade and Gilbert 
were ambiguous about whether the Court grounded their holdings in the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel or the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.29 Part 
II reviews Stovall, the third case in the Court’s 1967 trilogy.30 Even if one 
recognizes that Stovall’s result appears indefensible, the Warren Court elsewhere 
demonstrated a commitment to protecting innocent defendants from unduly 
suggestive identification procedures.31 Part III explores the question, “what if?” 
i.e. had the Court not moved so far to the right so quickly, how might Wade-Gilbert 
have evolved into far more meaningful protection, that would most likely favor 
innocent defendants, than the Burger Court provided?32 Indeed, some of the 
developments in state legislatures and lower courts that provide meaningful relief 
 
23.  E.g., Alan K. Austin, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1974); Howard B. 
Eisenberg & Bruce G. Feustel, Pretrial Identification: An Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria, 58 MARQ. 
L. REV. 659 (1975); see also Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 235 (1970) (“[Wade and Gilbert] involved extensions of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
. . .”). 
24.  Infra Part II. 
25.  Infra Part II. 
26.  Infra Part IV. 
27.  Infra Part IV. 
28.  Infra Part I. 
29.  Infra Part I. 
30.  Infra Part III. 
31.  Infra Part III. 
32.  Infra Part IV. 
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for suspects are consistent with the view that the Wade-Gilbert trilogy holdings 
were about protecting a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause (i.e. the 
right to confront witnesses against him).33 
I. WADE AND GILBERT 
In 1967, the Court decided Wade,34 Gilbert,35 and Stovall,36 all dealing with 
pre-trial identification proceedings. The Court seemed to ground its holdings in 
Wade and Gilbert on the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel clause, but with 
considerable ambiguity.37 The Court also seemed to ground the need for counsel 
on the Confrontation Clause: Without counsel’s involvement, a defendant was 
unable to effectively confront the witness who identified him.38 This section 
reviews those cases and then explores how the Burger Court cabined the 
protections hoped for in Wade and Gilbert. 
In Wade, the defendant was indicted for his participation in a bank robbery.39 
Following his arrest, the court appointed counsel for the defendant.40 Two weeks 
later, FBI agents placed the defendant in a lineup so that the bank employees could 
determine if Wade was the robber.41 The employees identified Wade.42 At trial, on 
cross-examination, both employees testified concerning their identification of 
Wade at the pretrial lineup.43 Wade’s counsel objected to the witnesses’s in-court 
identification because of the out-of-court denial of the right to counsel.44 
In Gilbert, formal proceedings had also begun against the defendant45 when 
the police used an unusually suggestive pretrial identification proceeding: About 
100 witnesses to several robberies allegedly committed by the defendant identified 
 
33.  Infra Part IV. 
34.  388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
35.  388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
36.  388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
37.  See Wade, 388 U.S. at 226–27 (“The security of [the accused’s right to a fair trial] is as much the aim 
of the right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth Amendment—the right of the accused to a 
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 
and his right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor.”). 
38.  Id. at 235 (“Insofar as the accused’s conviction may rest on a courtroom identification in fact the fruit 
of a suspect pretrial identification which the accused is helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the accused 
is deprived of that right of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to confront the witnesses 
against him.”). 
39.  Id. at 220. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
45.  See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 269 (1967) (Police conducted the lineup “without notice to his 
counsel in a Los Angeles auditorium 16 days after his indictment and after appointment of counsel.”). 
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him in each other’s presence.46 At trial, the prosecution relied on both the 
witnesses’s out-of-court and in-court identifications of Gilbert.47 
The Wade and Gilbert decisions held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel extended to out-of-court lineup procedures. Because the government had 
not relied on the out-of-court identification in Wade, the Court remanded the case 
to determine whether the in-court identification was the product of the uncounseled 
out-of-court lineup.48 Gilbert held that the state could not rely on the uncounseled 
out-of-court identification at all, although it might demonstrate that the in-court 
identification had an independent source.49 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, seemed to ground the holding in the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel clause.50 The opinion relied explicitly on Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel cases and focused on whether the pretrial lineup was 
a “critical stage” of the proceeding using a classic right to counsel analysis.51 
Although the opinion relied on analysis from Powell v. Alabama,52 a pre-
incorporation due process case, and Miranda v. Arizona,53 a Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel case, its discussion focused on the meaningful role of counsel as 
developed in those cases.54 The opinion also cited Massiah v. United States,55 
which involved police conduct that took place after the government had indicted 
the defendant. As developed below, viewing Wade and Gilbert narrowly as Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel cases allowed the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to 
render Wade-Gilbert protection almost meaningless.56 However, that narrow view 
failed to acknowledge the ambiguity in Justice Brennan’s opinions.57 
Wade-Gilbert determined that the line-up was a “critical stage” of criminal 
proceedings because of the need for counsel to protect a defendant’s right to 
confront the witness against him.58 As developed more fully below, treating Wade-
 
46.  Id. at 270. 
47.  Id. at 271. 
48.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 242. 
49.  Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272–74. 
50.  See id. at 272 (“We there held [in Wade] that police conduct of such a lineup without notice and in the 
absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in question the 
admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications . . .”) (emphasis added). 
51.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37; see also Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273. 
52.  287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
53.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
54.  See Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 (“[T]he principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that 
we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is 
necessary to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-
examine the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
55.  Id. 
56.  See discussion supra Part I. 
57.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 501 
(6th ed. 2017); see also id. at 499–500 regarding the ambiguity of Wade’s constitutional foundation. 
58.  See Wade, 388 U.S. at 224–25 (“[T]oday’s law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations 
of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and 
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal prosecution, our 
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Gilbert as right to confrontation cases would have produced a dramatically 
different legal landscape, one far more protective of innocent defendants than the 
one we have today.59 Here is some of the language suggesting that counsel was a 
prophylaxis to protect a defendant’s right-to-confrontation: “. . . in this case it is 
urged that the assistance of counsel at the lineup was indispensable to protect 
Wade’s most basic right as a criminal defendant—his right to a fair trial at which 
the witnesses against him might be meaningfully cross-examined.”60 
In addition to references regarding the right to confront witnesses, Justice 
Brennan highlighted the risks associated with eye-witness identification 
procedures: The improperly suggestive procedures “probably account[] for more 
miscarriages of justice than any other single factor . . . .”61 Once a witness has 
identified a suspect as the perpetrator, the witness seldom retracts the identification 
in open court.62 Further, in language that echoes the role of counsel in the Miranda 
setting, Justice Brennan discussed the role of counsel at a lineup: Counsel 
seemingly would be able to identify and perhaps prevent unduly suggestive 
influences that would otherwise make cross-examination at trial meaningless.63 
Hence, as with Miranda, the Court seemed to require counsel to protect another 
right: the right to confrontation. 
That was not to be. The Burger Court began to narrow Wade-Gilbert 
protections almost immediately. In subsequent cases, the Court narrowed the 
reading of Wade-Gilbert so extensively that one suspects counsel almost never 
attends a lineup.64 
Except for a brief moment, the Court continues to hold that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the state has begun formal 
proceedings. The notable, short-lived exception was Escobedo v. Illinois.65 There, 
 
cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to ‘critical’ stages of the proceedings. The 
guarantee reads: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence [sic].’ (Emphasis supplied.) The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel’s 
assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful ‘defence [sic].’”). 
59.  Infra Part II. 
60.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 223–24. 
61.  Id. at 228–29. 
62.  See id. at 229 (quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades I, CRIM. L. REV. 479, 482 
(1963) (“[I]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he 
is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other 
relevant evidence) for all practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.”). 
63.  See id. at 231–32 (“In short, the accused’s inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that 
occurred at the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the 
witness’ courtroom identification.”); c.f. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 445 (1964) (“An understanding of 
the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today. The difficulty in depicting 
what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they have largely taken place 
incommunicado.”).  
64.  I was unable to find any data on how often counsel attends post-formal charge line-ups. As a matter of 
common sense, prosecutors prefer pre-indictment line-ups for many reasons, including the need to be sure that 
the suspect is the right person before formal charges are brought and the desire to avoid the cumbersome 
involvement of counsel at a line-up. 
65.  378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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a suspect in police custody requested, and was denied, the right to see his 
attorney.66 Despite the absence of formal charges, the Court held that the 
defendant’s right to counsel was violated, at least on the facts of the case, once the 
police had “focused” on the defendant.67 Two years later, Miranda shifted the 
analysis from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the Fifth Amendment right 
to be free from being compelled to be a witness against oneself when the police 
engage in custodial interrogation.68 
Perhaps—not surprisingly—after Wade-Gilbert, lower courts were divided on 
whether a suspect had a right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup.69 In effect, 
lower courts were at odds as to whether Wade and Gilbert were pure Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel cases or whether the constitutional right at stake was 
the right to confront witnesses at trial, protected by the Confrontation Clause.70 
The newly constructed Burger Court resolved that question in 1972 when it 
decided Kirby v. Illinois.71 
In Kirby, the police arrested the defendant and secured an identification before 
he had been formally charged.72 The Court divided 5-4 in its holding.73 Justice 
Stewart’s plurality opinion (subsequently adopted as the law by a majority of the 
Court)74 held that Wade-Gilbert applied only after commencement of formal 
proceedings.75 Notably, Nixon appointees Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun and 
 
66.  See id. at 481 (“Notwithstanding repeated requests by each, petitioner and his retained lawyer were 
afforded no opportunity to consult during the course of the entire interrogation.”). 
67.  See id. at 490–91 (“We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general 
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into 
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating 
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police 
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 
‘The Assistance of Counsel’ in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as ‘made obligatory upon 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,’ Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 342, 83 S.Ct., at 795 and that no 
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.”). 
68.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439 (“The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts 
of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution 
in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained 
from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure 
that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled 
to incriminate himself.”). 
69.  LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 500. 
70.  Id. at 501. 
71.  406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
72.  See id. at 684 (“In the present case we are asked to extend the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule 
to identification testimony based upon a police station showup that took place before the defendant had been 
indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.”). 
73.  See Kirby, 406 U.S. 682 (Mr. Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in 
which The Chief Justice , Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join; Mr. Justice Powell filed 
statement concurring in the result; Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas 
and Mr. Justice Marshall joined; Mr. Justice White filed a dissenting statement). 
74.  See generally United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 322 (1973); see also discussion infra.  
75.  See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688 (“In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court’s 
landmark opinion in Powell v. Alabama, it has been firmly established that a person’s Sixth and Fourteenth 
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William Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart’s opinion.76 Justice Powell, the fourth 
Nixon appointee, concurred and stated tersely that he would not extend Wade-
Gilbert’s per se exclusionary rule.77 
In Kirby, Justice Brennan wrote for three of the dissenting justices arguing that 
the plurality’s characterization of the issue was wrong.78 Justice Stewart framed 
the Kirby issue as whether the Court should “extend” the Court’s holdings in Wade 
and Gilbert.79 While Justice Brennan acknowledged that those cases involved post-
indictment lineups, he urged that “Wade’s rationale leaves little doubt that the post-
indictment language was merely descriptive.”80 Brennan also emphasized the need 
for counsel at the lineup as a means of protecting the right to confront witnesses at 
trial.81 He made explicit that those cases relied on the Confrontation Clause.82 
Justice White, a dissenter in Wade and Gilbert, nonetheless also wrote a dissenting 
opinion in Kirby and there stated tersely that Wade and Gilbert “govern this case 
and compel reversal of the judgment.”83 
The Court continued to erode Wade and Gilbert in United States v. Ash.84 
There, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, and joined by the other Nixon 
appointees the Court held that the right to counsel did not extend to a post-
indictment photo array85 because it was not a “critical stage” of the criminal 
proceedings.86 That, of course, is the language of the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel case law.87 Justice Brennan’s dissent in Ash relied on his analysis 
 
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been 
initiated against him.” (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 690 (“We decline to depart from that rationale 
today by imposing a per se exclusionary rule upon testimony concerning an identification that took place long 
before the commencement of any prosecution whatever.”). 
76.  Id. 
77.  See id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring) (“As I would not extend the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary 
rule, I concur in the result reached by the Court.”). 
78.  See id. at 696–97 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]he initiation of adversary judicial criminal 
proceedings,’ is completely irrelevant to whether counsel is necessary at a pretrial confrontation for identification 
in order to safeguard the accused’s constitutional rights to confrontation and the effective assistance of counsel at 
his trial.”). 
79.  Id. at 684. 
80.  Joseph D. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the 
Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717, 726 (1974). 
81.  Kirby, 406 U.S. at 695–96. 
82.  Id. at 696. 
83.  Id. at 705 (White, J., dissenting). 
84.  413 U.S. 300 (1973).  
85.  See id. at 321 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays 
conducted by the Government . . .”). 
86.  See id. at 300 (“A pretrial event constitutes a ‘critical stage’ when the accused requires aid in coping 
with legal problems or help in meeting his adversary. Since the accused is not present at the time of the 
photographic display, and, as here, asserts no right to be present, there is no possibility that he might be misled 
by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.”); see also id. at 326 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds today that a pretrial display of photographs to the witnesses of a crime 
for the purpose of identifying the accused, unlike a lineup, does not constitute a ‘critical stage’ of the prosecution 
at which the accused is constitutionally entitled to the presence of counsel.”). 
87.  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37 (quoting Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 
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from Wade and Gilbert, with an emphasis on the resulting inability of counsel to 
effectively confront witnesses whose testimony might have been improperly 
influenced by a suggestive procedure at the pre-trial identification proceedings.88 
Subsequent case law has focused primarily on whether particular procedures 
used by the police were unduly suggestive.89 Over time, the Court has made clear 
that the standard to be applied—a totality of the circumstances test—is not 
especially demanding.90 Justices seem to believe that trial counsel can erode the 
jury’s confidence in an eyewitness identification if it was based on a suggestive 
one-on-one show up or photo array, and thus not violative of the defendant’s right 
to confront the witnesses against him.91 
Piece the puzzle together: if, as some courts believed, Brennan’s majority 
grounded Wade and Gilbert in the Confrontation Clause, not in the right to counsel 
clause, the Court would have resolved cases like Kirby and Ash differently. The 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel “trigger,” commencement of formal 
proceedings, would be irrelevant. Instead, a court would have to resolve whether 
the police procedures rendered cross-examination at trial so ineffective that the 
procedures violated the Confrontation Clause. 
 
(1932) (characterizing the post-indictment lineup as a “critical state” of the prosecution such that a defendant is 
“as much entitled to such aid (of counsel) as at the trial itself.”); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 272 
(“[A] post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical stage 
of the criminal prosecution; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the absence of his counsel 
denies the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-
court identifications of the accused by witnesses who attended the lineup.”); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 
(1967) (holding that confrontation of an accused for identification is a critical stage of criminal proceedings, and 
counsel is required at such confrontations). 
88.  See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 326–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing, consistent with the 
rationale in Wade that counsel’s function at an identification lineup is to “detect the existence of any suggestive 
influences” and thereafter “effectively reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred,” in actuality there is “no 
meaningful difference, in terms of the need for attendance of counsel, between corporeal and photographic 
identifications.”).  
89.  See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (an identification procedure including only 
one photograph “may be viewed in general with suspicion,” but the Court found no substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification given the totality of the circumstances); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 
229–30 (1977) (finding it “difficult to imagine a more suggestive manner” than an identification procedure where 
the victim “was asked to make her identification after she was told that she was going to view a suspect, after she 
was told his name and heard it called as he was led before the bench, and after she heard the prosecutor recite the 
evidence believed to implicate petitioner.”). 
90.  See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–201 (1972) (finding “no substantial likelihood of 
misidentification” in police procedures where, after giving a vague description to police, the witness viewed thirty 
to forty photographs over a period of seven months and made no definite identification of any suspect—despite 
the Court conceding “the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”). 
91.  See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968)) (“Surely, we cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is ‘a very substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification’. . . Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh.”); see also Kansas 
v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594, n.* (2009) (holding statements elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
admissible to impeach defendant’s inconsistent testimony at trial because “[our] legal system. . . is built on the 
premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing witnesses.”); United States v. 
Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988) (declining to adopt a clear rule that out-of-court statements of identification 
“with the mere possibility of suggestive procedures” are unreliable and violative of Due Process, instead requiring 
the question be left to the jury). 
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II. STOVALL AND BEYOND  
Stovall v. Denno92 was the Court’s third eyewitness identification case decided 
in 1967. Many commentators argue that Stovall demonstrates a lack of 
commitment to protecting innocent suspects.93 As developed below, while the 
decision in Stovall is hard to justify, Foster v. California,94 decided shortly before 
Chief Justice Warren stepped down, demonstrated a much greater commitment to 
protecting innocent suspects from overly suggestive identification procedures.95 
Stovall involved difficult facts. The eyewitness was the victim of a brutal 
attack in which her husband was murdered.96 She lay in a hospital bed where she 
had just undergone life-saving surgery.97 Five officers surrounded Stovall, the only 
African American man in the room.98 He was handcuffed to one of the officers.99 
She identified Stovall after an officer directed him to make a “few words for voice 
identification.”100 The procedure took place after the postponement of the suspect’s 
arraignment so that Stovall could retain counsel.101 At trial, witnesses testified as 
to the identification in the victim’s hospital room and also made an in-court 
identification of Stovall.102 
At issue in Stovall was whether Wade and Gilbert applied retroactively.103 The 
Court found that those cases did not apply to cases like Stovall’s that arrived in 
front of the Court on habeas corpus (i.e., did not apply retroactively).104 
 
92.  388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
93.  See, e.g., Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 191 (“Thus, the great victory in Wade and Gilbert 
turned to ashes, and the losers were not guilty criminal defendants but the innocent who do not need a lawyer but 
do need a due process protection against unreliable identifications that is more precise and more robust than the 
vague mess that is Stovall.”). 
94.  394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
95.  For a discussion of Foster and Stovall as jurisprudence, see discussion infra. In a more historical vein: 
the Court decided Foster on April 1, 1969 and Chief Justice Warren handed down the final decision of his Court 
on June 23, 1969. See also JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE, 506 
(2006). 
96.  Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967). 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id.  
103.  See id. at 294 (“This case therefore provides a vehicle for deciding the extent to which the rules 
announced in Wade and Gilbert—requiring the exclusion of identification evidence which is tainted by exhibiting 
the accused to identifying witnesses before trial in the absence of his counsel—are to be applied retroactively.”). 
104.  See id. at 299–300 (“The overwhelming majority of American courts have always treated the evidence 
question not as one of admissibility but as one of credibility for the jury. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in 
Criminal Cases 38. Law enforcement authorities fairly relied on this virtually unanimous weight of authority, now 
no longer valid, in conducting pretrial confrontations in the absence of counsel. It is, therefore, very clear that 
retroactive application of Wade and Gilbert ‘would seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws.’ 
Johnson v. State of New Jersey, at 731, 86 S.Ct., at 1780.”); see also id. at 300 (“At the very least, the processing 
of current criminal calendars would be disrupted while hearings were conducted to determine taint, if any, in 
identification evidence, and whether in any event the admission of the evidence was harmless error. Doubtless, 
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Apart from the Sixth Amendment Wade-Gilbert protections, the Stovall Court 
also held that a suspect additionally has a due process right implicated in 
eyewitness identification procedures.105 According to Stovall, an eyewitness 
identification that is “so unnecessarily suggestive” may violate due process.106 In 
light of the totality of the circumstances, a violation would occur if the suggestive 
procedures are “conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.”107 
Stovall seems indefensible. As Professor Thomas has observed, “[i]t is difficult 
to imagine a more suggestive procedure . . . .”108 Only in partial defense of the 
decision, the Court relied on the Second Circuit en banc opinion that focused 
closely on the extreme circumstances of the case with a victim who might not 
survive, suggesting that the urgency to make an identification overrode concerns 
regarding what might otherwise be deemed unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures.109 
The Warren Court revisited Stovall twice. One commentator has argued that 
Simmons v. United States110 was the first step leading to the erosion of Stovall’s 
already limited protection.111 The Simmons formulation of the due process test was 
more pro-prosecution: while Stovall condemned “unnecessarily suggestive”112 
procedures such that they were “conducive to irreparable misidentification,”113 
Simmons stated that a procedure would have to be “so impermissibly suggestive as 
to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”114 
Subsequent Burger Court decisions certainly moved even further away from the 
language in Stovall.115 
 
too, inquiry would be handicapped by the unavailability of witnesses and dim memories. We conclude, therefore, 
that the Wade and Gilbert rules should not be made retroactive.”). 
105.  See id. at 302–03 (holding that even if a petitioner is not entitled to protection under Wade-Gilbert, 
he may be entitled to relief on a claim that the confrontation conducted was “so unnecessarily suggestive and 
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.”). 
106.  Id. at 302. 
107.  Id.   
108.  Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 190. 
109.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (“‘Here was the only person in the world who could possibly exonerate 
Stovall. Her words, and only her words, ‘He is not the man’ could have resulted in freedom for Stovall. The 
hospital was not far distant from the courthouse and jail. No one knew how long Mrs. Behrendt might live. Faced 
with the responsibility of identifying the attacker, with the need for immediate action and with the knowledge that 
Mrs. Behrendt could not visit the jail, the police followed the only feasible procedure and took Stovall to the 
hospital room. Under these circumstances, the usual police station line-up, which Stovall now argues he should 
have had, was out of the question.’” (quoting Second Circuit Court of Appeals)). 
110.  390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
111.  David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to Return to the Wade 
Trilogy’s Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 589 (1987).   
112.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384. 
115.  See generally Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (holding that while the station-house identification 
may have been suggestive, under the totality of the circumstances test the victim’s identification of respondent 
was reliable and was properly allowed to go to the jury where a woman identified her assailant as he walked past 
her in the police station after being instructed to say “shut up or I’ll kill you” just as her original attacker had 
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Despite the different formulation of the test, the other post-Stovall decision 
dealing with due process protection in the identification setting demonstrated a 
more robust commitment to protecting suspects than did Stovall and post-Warren 
Court decisions. Foster v. California,116 decided about two months before Chief 
Justice Warren stepped down, and written by Justice Fortas, involved an 
eyewitness to a robbery who initially could not make a clear identification of the 
defendant.117 The police called the witness to the police station and showed him a 
lineup consisting of only three people.118 Foster was about six feet tall and the other 
members of the lineup were short, perhaps five feet or five and a half feet tall.119 
The witness stated that he thought that Foster’s leather jacket was familiar; 
nonetheless, he could not make a definitive identification.120 That inability to 
conclusively identify Foster did not change even after the police brought the 
witness into a room with Foster for a further interview.121 Only after the police 
arranged a second lineup, a week or ten days later, was the witness “‘convinced’ 
[that Foster] was the man.”122 
As in Stovall, Foster could not claim a violation of his right to counsel because 
the identification occurred pre-Wade-Gilbert.123 Unlike Stovall and Simmons, the 
Court found that the procedure used violated due process, requiring a new trial.124 
The Court made clear that such suggestive procedures could lead to conviction of 
the innocent.125 
Certainly, critics of the Warren Court’s Stovall decision have plenty to 
criticize. As Professor Thomas has stated, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a more 
suggestive procedure.”126 Two years later, however, the Foster Court demonstrated 
a much more rigorous approach to its due process suggestiveness test, an approach 
not followed by the Court since the end of the Warren Court. 
 
done); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (holding that “while the identification procedure was 
suggestive since only one photograph was used, and while it was unnecessary since there was no emergency or 
exigent circumstance, there did not, under the totality of the circumstances, exist a substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification, where the identification was made by a trained police officer who had a sufficient 
opportunity to view the suspect, accurately described him, positively identified his photograph, and made the 
photograph identification only two days after the crime.”). 
116.  394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
117.  Id. at 441. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at 441–42. 
123.  Id. at 442. 
124.  Id. at 442–43. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Thomas, Road Not Taken, supra note 11, at 190.  
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III. WADE, GILBERT, AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: WHAT IF? 
As argued above, the Warren Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis seemed 
grounded in concerns about protecting innocent suspects.127 That is certainly true 
if one views Wade-Gilbert as Confrontation Clause cases. This section lays out 
some additional support to what I have argued above, demonstrating that those 
cases did take seriously the Confrontation Clause as a basis for the Court’s 
holding.128 It also explores some of the confusion generated by the Wade-Gilbert 
decisions, notably, concerning counsel’s role at a lineup.129 In addition, it focuses 
on Justice Brennan’s suggestion in Wade that legislatures might come up with 
alternative protections for suspects forced into lineups.130 Given the fluidity of the 
Court’s rationale and explicit concern about avoiding misidentification, I argue 
below that the Court, not dominated by law-and-order justices, may well have 
evolved Wade-Gilbert in a direction clearly aimed not at formal representation by 
counsel but at protecting innocent suspects.131 
Above, I cited some of the Confrontation Clause language relied on by Justice 
Brennan in Wade.132 There was more: 
 
[T]he confrontation compelled by the State between the accused 
and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification 
evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and 
variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate 
from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification are 
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of 
mistaken identification.133 
 
The role of counsel in Wade seems akin to the role of counsel in the Miranda 
custodial-interrogation setting. Counsel was a means to protect some other 
fundamental rights: in Miranda, the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to 
be a witness against oneself,134 in Wade-Gilbert, the Sixth Amendment 
 
127.  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (emphasizing the “indispensable” nature of the 
presence of counsel because “today’s law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused 
by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the 
trial itself to a mere formality.”); see also id. at 228 (warning that “the vagaries of eyewitness identification are 
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification,” with “the degree of 
suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses” being “a major 
factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice.”).   
128.  Infra Part III. 
129.  Infra Part III. 
130.  Infra Part III. 
131.  Infra Part III. 
132.  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1967). 
133.  Id. at 227–28.  
134.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 436 (1966) (holding “statements obtained from defendants during 
incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights, were 
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Confrontation Clause. 
Wade also demonstrated recognition of police tactics leading to potentially 
false accusations.135 Brennan’s opinion listed numerous examples of highly 
suggestive lineups.136  Brennan was explicit: 
 
[As a] matter of common experience [we know] that, once a 
witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely 
to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of 
identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all 
practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.137 
 
He also referred to a then-developing literature about misidentification and the 
risk to innocent defendants.138 Of course, today we know far more about the 
correlation between misidentification and the conviction of innocent defendants: 
as found by an Innocence Project study of exonerated defendants, 77% of those 
cases involved misidentification.139 
 
inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
135.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 234–35 (“The few cases that have surfaced [] reveal the existence of a process 
attended with hazards of serious unfairness to the criminal accused and strongly suggest the plight of the more 
numerous defendants who are unable to ferret out suggestive influences in the secrecy of confrontation. We do 
not assume that these risks are the result of police procedures intentionally designed to prejudice an accused. 
Rather, we assume they derive from the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility 
inherent in the context of the pretrial identification.”); see also id. at 235 (“The fact that the police themselves 
have, in a given case, little or no doubt that the man put up for identification has committed the offense, and that 
their chief-preoccupation is with the problem of getting sufficient proof, because he has not ‘come clean,’ involves 
a a [sic] danger that this persuasion may communicate itself even in a doubtful case to the witness in some way.”) 
(quoting William and Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part I, 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 479, 483 (1963)). 
136.  See id. at 232–33 (procedures “for example, that all in the lineup but the suspect were known to the 
identifying witness [People v. James, 218 Cal.App.2d 166 (1963); People v. Boney, 28 Ill.2d 505 (1963)], that 
the other participants in a lineup were grossly dissimilar in appearance to the suspect [Fredricksen v. United 
States, 266 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1959); People v. Adell, 75 Ill.App.2d 385 (1966); State v. Hill, 193 Kan. 512 
(1964); People v. Seppi, 221 N.Y. 62 (1917); State v. Duggan, 215 Or. 151 (1958)], that only the suspect was 
required to wear distinctive clothing which the culprit allegedly wore [People v. Crenshaw, 15 Ill.2d 458 (1959); 
Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550 (1961); State v. Ramirez, 76 N.M. 72 (1966); State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336 
(1927); Barrett v. State, 190 Tenn. 366 (1950)], that the witness is told by the police that they have caught the 
culprit after which the defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in jail [Aaron v. State, 273 Ala. 
337 (1961); Bishop v. State, 236 Ark. 12 (1963); People v. Thompson, 406 Ill. 555 (1950); People v. Berne, 384 
Ill. 334 (1943); People v. Martin, 304 Ill. 494 (1922); Barrett v. State, 190 Tenn. 366 (1950)], that the suspect is 
pointed out before or during a lineup [People v. Clark, 28 Ill.2d 423 (1963); Gillespie v. State, 355 P.2d 451 
(Okl.Cr. 1960)], and that the participants in the lineup are asked to try on an article of clothing which fits only the 
suspect [People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378 (1963)].”). 
137.  Id. at 228 (quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part I, 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 
479, 482 (1963)). 
138.  See generally id. 
139.  Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, 200 Exonerated: Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, THE INNOCENCE 
PROJECT AT BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. OF L. 18–19, available at https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/ip_200.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review).   
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Further, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Manson v. Brathwaite140 underscores 
that, at least in his and Justice Brennan’s view, the 1967 Wade trilogy was to 
provide protection against improper identification: 
 
The foundation of the Wade trilogy was the Court’s recognition 
of the “high incidence of miscarriage of justice” resulting from the 
admission of mistaken eyewitness identification evidence at 
criminal trials. . . . Relying on numerous studies made over many 
years by such scholars as Professor Wigmore and Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, the Court concluded that “[t]he vagaries of 
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal 
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.” . . . It is, of 
course, impossible to control one source of such errors the faulty 
perceptions and unreliable memories of witnesses except through 
vigorously contested trials conducted by diligent counsel and 
judges. The Court in the Wade cases acted, however, to minimize 
the more preventable threat posed to accurate identification by 
“the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the 
prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial 
identification.”141 
 
Again, this language suggests the primary goal was to protect innocent 
suspects. 
From inception, the role of counsel in Wade-Gilbert was uncertain.142 Was the 
attorney to make contemporaneous objections if a lineup appeared unfair? Was she 
to observe potential suggestiveness so that her cross-examination would be more 
effective because of her personal observations? Was the attorney to become a 
witness at a suppression hearing and to testify about the corrupting influence of 
improper police conduct? 
Wade suggested that an attorney who witnessed the lineup was in a better 
position to engage in meaningful cross-examination.143 In Ash, the Court stated 
 
140.  432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977). 
141.  Id. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
142.  See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 503 (citing Note, 64 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 428, 433 (1973)) (“In 
post-indictment line-ups it is not readily apparent what immediate assistance an attorney can provide. He cannot 
stop the line-up or see that it be conducted in a certain manner. He can give no legal advice, proffer no defenses, 
advance no arguments. The defendant is not in need of legal advice and the lawyer is not in a position to provide 
on the spot assistance against the skills of the prosecutor.”). 
143.  See id. at 499 (“The Court in Wade explained that under past lineup practices, the defense was often 
unable ‘meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness’ courtroom identification’ because of several facts 
that militate against developing fully the circumstances of a prior lineup identification by that witness.”); see also 
id. (“The intended constitutional foundation of the Wade decision was not entirely clear from the Court’s decision. 
The Court talked about the lineup being a ‘critical stage’ at which defendant was as much entitled to counsel as 
at trial, which would seem to indicate that Wade was grounded in Sixth Amendment right to counsel. But in 
explaining why this was so, the Wade majority referred to the fact that ‘presence of counsel itself can often assure 
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that Wade was based on having counsel present because counsel would be “more 
sensitive to, and aware of, suggestive influences than the accused himself, and 
better able to reconstruct events at trial.”144 But as an observer, counsel may have 
relevant information to provide at a suppression hearing.145 That role, of course, 
creates problems for defense counsel: according to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, counsel might have to withdraw and become a witness at trial.146 
Despite some language in Wade suggesting a limited-observer role for counsel 
at the lineup, other language suggests a more active role. Notably, the court stated, 
“presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice,”147 and can prevent “the 
infiltration of taint in the prosecution’s identification evidence.”148 This suggests 
that counsel was supposed to negotiate or otherwise insert herself into the 
identification process. Because the Burger Court so effectively cabined Wade and 
Gilbert, the Court never had to explain counsel’s role at a lineup. 
As the Court did in Miranda, Justice Brennan suggested in Wade that 
legislatures might come up with an equally effective remedy to the right to counsel 
at the lineup: 
 
Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police 
departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional 
suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to 
meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for 
regarding the stage as ‘critical.’ But neither Congress nor the 
federal authorities have seen fit to provide a solution. What we 
hold today ‘in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which 
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have 
this effect.’149 
 
At a minimum, the language suggests that Brennan’s primary concern was the 
Confrontation Clause problem, not an independent right to counsel. As indicated, 
prior to Kirby, lower courts divided over the meaning of Wade and Gilbert. What 
 
a meaningful confrontation at trial.’ Indeed the Court repeatedly referred to the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation and cross-examination in Wade, suggesting that the decision was grounded in the Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation and cross-examination, with counsel being required simply to give sufficient protection to 
that other right.” (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 232 (1967)). 
144.  United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1974). 
145.  See id. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Wade envisioned counsel’s function at the lineup to be 
primarily that of a trained observer, able to detect the existence of any suggestive influences and capable of 
understanding the legal implications of the events that transpire. Having witnessed the proceedings, counsel 
would then be in a position effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup, thereby 
preserving the accused’s fundamental right to a fair trial on the issue of identification.”).   
146.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (2019) (requiring that a lawyer not “advocate at a 
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness” to a contested issue). 
147.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 236.   
148.  Id. at 237. 
149.  Id. at 239. 
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if cases emerged in which the Court had to define counsel’s role? What if 
experience showed that counsel could not do much to protect suspects from 
suggestive influences in lineups? 
We know what kinds of procedures are at least as effective as the right to 
counsel at a lineup and what kinds are probably more effective.150 Given the 
increasing body of literature pointing to the high correlation between the 
conviction of innocent defendants and inaccurate eyewitness identification,151 
might the Court have pushed law enforcement towards some of the practices 
developed in states that have taken seriously the concern about convicting 
innocents? 
The past decade has seen efforts from around the country.152 Several states 
require lineups to be conducted by an independent administrator who does not 
know which of the individuals in the lineup is the suspect.153 Some also require 
that a person who does identify a suspect specify the level of confidence in making 
the identification.154 
Some states additionally require that the police tell witnesses that the 
 
150.  See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 516 (“[I]t seems obvious that similarity of race, physical 
features, size, age and dress of lineup participants is a prerequisite to avoidance of suggestion, at least as to 
distinctive characteristics described to the police beforehand by witnesses. . .”); see also PATRICK WALL, EYE-
WITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 53 (1965) (showing commentators agree that lineups should 
contain about six similar participants); see also id. at 70–73 (proposing a prohibition on photographic 
identification when a suspect is in custody or a lineup is otherwise feasible [because photo identifications are less 
reliable.]).   
151.  See, e.g., BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011) (finding that 190 in the first 250 
DNA-exoneration cases [76%] had at least one erroneous eyewitness identification); Samuel R. Gross at al., 
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 523, 542 (2005) (arguing 
that misidentifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions); see also Comment, 43 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 213, 214 (2002) (“[M]istaken eyewitness identifications were a major cause in sixty of the first eighty-two 
DNA exonerations handled by the Innocence Project [73%].”); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE, & 
JENNIFER E. DYSART, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 2–4 (2013); Felice J. Levine & June Louin 
Tapp, Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1082 
(1973).   
152.  E.g., Florida passed CS/SB 312-, the Eyewitness Identification, Reform Act, in early 2017. The statute 
became effective on Oct. 1, 2017. FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CS/SB 312 - Eyewitness Identification, 
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=56856&SessionId=83 (last visited Aug. 
20, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
153.  See, e.g., Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.70(3)(a)(1)-(3) (West) (A lineup “must be conducted by an 
independent administrator,” or if not, by using an automated computer program, a blind folder-shuffling 
procedure, or any “other procedure that achieves neutral administration and prevents the lineup administrator 
from knowing which photograph is being presented to the eyewitness during the identification procedure.”); see 
also Illinois, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/107A-2(a)(1) (West) (Lineups shall be conducted by an “independent 
administrator, unless it is not practical”); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-284.52(b)(1) (West) 
(requiring an independent administrator or the alternatives listed also in Florida’s statute); California, Cal. Pen. 
Code § 859.7(a)(2) [Operative Jan. 1, 2020] (requiring identification procedures be conducted using “blind 
administration or blinded administration.”). 
154.  See, e.g., North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-284.52(b)(12) (West) (The independent 
administrator must “seek and document a clear statement. . . as to the eyewitness’s confidence level that the 
person identified in a given lineup is the perpetrator.”); see also California, Cal. Pen. Code § 859.7(a)(10)(A) 
[Operative Jan. 1, 2020] (“The investigator shall immediately inquire as to the eyewitness’ confidence level in 
the accuracy of the identification and record in writing, verbatim, what the eyewitness says.”). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
885 
perpetrator may not, in fact, be in the lineup.155 Other protections include jury 
instructions about the fallibility of eyewitness identification and/or the use of 
experts to explain the limits of eyewitness identification.156 Some states also 
require videotaping of lineups to allow at least some check on improperly 
suggestive practices.157 
Would the Court have required such remedies? I can only speculate. While 
some state courts have required various remedial steps absent legislative 
enactment, those courts have usually done so based on their supervisory power, 
not on constitutional grounds.158 However, had a post-Warren liberal Court 
survived, the Supreme Court might have encouraged or required more effective 
remedies than the limited protection afforded by the Wade-Gilbert decisions. If 
counsel was, in effect, a remedial device—a prophylaxis—to protect core 
Confrontation Clause protections, those cases would have remained significant 
because they would have provided meaningful protection against the conviction of 
innocent defendants. 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Did the Warren Court pay too little attention to protecting innocent 
defendants? Its agenda between 1961 and 1969 was ambitious. Many of its 
decisions advanced policies other than protecting innocent defendants.159 Most 
notably, Mapp’s extension of the exclusionary rule to the states has worked as a 
check on abusive police practices.160 For better or worse, Miranda demonstrated a 
 
155.  E.g., Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.70(3)(b)(1) (West); Illinois, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/107A-
2(e)(1)(B) (West); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-284.52(b)(3)(A) (West); California, Cal. Pen. 
Code § 859.7(a)(4)(A) [Operative Jan. 1, 2020]. 
156.  See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 296 (2011) (allowing expert testimony and directing that 
“enhanced instructions be given to guide juries about the various factors that may affect the reliability of an 
identification in a particular case,” including the witness’s opportunity to view the event and degree of attention, 
time elapsed between event and identification, and witness confidence in the identification); see also 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 376 (2015) (requiring, in light of “near consensus in the relevant 
scientific community,” instructions be given to provide juries “more comprehensive guidance when evaluating 
eyewitness testimony.”); State v. Mahmoud, 147 A.3d 833, 839 (Me. 2016) (holding instructions regarding 
eyewitness fallibility may be given, though not required). 
157.  See Illinois, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/107A-2(h) (“Unless it is not practical or the eyewitness 
refuses, a video record of all lineup procedures shall be made.”); see also California, Cal. Pen. Code § 859.7(a)(11) 
[Operative Jan. 1, 2020] (“An electronic recording shall be made that includes both audio and visual 
representations of the identification procedures.”). 
158.  See, e.g., Gomes, 470 Mass. at 352 (providing protection against erroneous witness identification 
through model jury instructions). 
159.  This should not be surprising. Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights advance policies other than 
protecting the innocent. The Fourth Amendment often protects guilty defendants from improper police conduct. 
Any protection of the innocent is the result of deterring police from overreaching. The Fifth Amendment right to 
be free from testifying against oneself often prevents access to highly relevant evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 
Clearly, one should not suppose protection of the innocent as its primary justification.  
160.  See SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
1950-1990 51 (1993) (cited with approval in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006)).  
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commitment to equality and limited overreaching by the police.161 But, to 
characterize the Warren Court as indifferent to protecting innocent defendant’s 
overstates the case. Notably, as developed in this article, by using express terms in 
the eyewitness identification cases, the Warren Court was clearly concerned with 
avoiding convictions of innocent defendants.162 
But for President Johnson’s political mistake in attempting to elevate Justice 
Fortas, we might well have had a liberal Court well past the 1970’s.163 Of course, 
one can only speculate how such a Court would have evolved the eyewitness-
identification case law. Given the Warren Court’s concern with misidentification 
of innocent defendants, and Justice Brennan’s repeated references to the 
Confrontation Clause,164 might the Court have expanded protection beyond post-
indictment lineups and developed a more robust protection? I wish we could turn 
back the clock and have a do-over. 
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164.  Supra Part II; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967). 
